We examine the early marketing and distribution of entertainment radio sets. Manufacturers used distribution networks to both maximise profits and create barriers to entry. Lacking the market power of auto manufacturers, they developed cooperative strategies with authorised distributors and dealers. Dealers often complained about the costly activities manufacturers required of them. However, these underpinned the dominant quality and branding competition model of the 1920s, while the Depression era switch to a simpler radio format, sold on price, proved catastrophic for the specialist retailer.
Together with the automobile, entertainment radio was the key transformative communications technology of the 1920s. Radio broadcasting had wide-reaching impacts:
unifying an ethnically and culturally diverse nation, reducing the isolation of rural and smalltown America, introducing regional music styles to a national audience, and bringing a new, intrusive, and inescapable form of advertising into people's homes. Radio even had a major impact in reducing linguistic diversity, establishing 'broadcast English' as the new national popular norm.
i Even compared to earlier communications technologies -the telegraph, railroad, and telephone -its impact was dramatic; both in terms of the broad range of information and entertainment it instantly conveyed and its extremely rapid diffusion.
ii To meet the explosive demand for radio, manufacturers required effective downstream distribution systems. Existing high-ticket consumer goods offered a variety of models. Singer marketed their sewing machines principally through their own retail outlets.
iii Meanwhile auto producers assumed considerable control over franchised dealership networks. Radio appeared to have stronger parallels with three novel labour-saving appliances being introduced to American homes via aggressive salesmanship -vacuum cleaners, washing machines, and refrigerators. These were characterised by high prices, a consequent reliance of time-payment plans, and inter-firm competition based on intensive promotion, branding, and quality, rather than price.
In contrast to these 'white goods', which faced very strong initial consumer resistance and inertia, necessitating 'push selling' by door-to-door salesmen trained and supervised by the manufacturer, radio instantly found a ready market. Yet set-makers faced greater business risks than white goods producers, owing to the lack of strong technical economies of scale in production, the consequent ease of entry to the sector, and rapid and unpredictable technical obsolescence. They thus sought to market their products co-operatively with independent distributors (wholesalers) and dealers (retailers), who were incentivised to conform to their marketing policy and promote their brand over competitors. Dealers increasingly perceived that the level, and mix, of marketing activities advocated by manufacturers was not optimal from their perspective. Door-to-door canvassing presented a particular grievance. Many retailers found that this acted to boost sales, but not profits, while incurring significant managerial problems in monitoring and motivating salesmen. Our analysis confirms dealers' perceptions that, by the late 1920s, door-to-door sales were of much greater benefit to the manufacturer than the dealer. However, this nevertheless provided dealers with some measure of protection from competition. During the depression manufacturers' control over distribution networks broke down and dealers (desperate to survive in a market overloaded with surplus stock at distress prices), embraced a new, radically cheaper, radio set format, the midget, produced by firms outside the mainstream industry. By doing so they undermined their key differentiating advantages compared to general retailers and precipitated the rapid decline of the specialist radio dealer.
Manufacturers' promotional and distribution strategies
The launch of entertainment radio at the start of the 1920s was followed by a boom in equipment sales, unprecedented for any high-ticket household durable. Value chains are useful devices for analysing the coordinating mechanisms governing the design, production, and marketing of consumer durables. They identify both the key players involved in organizing the sequence of activities that brings the good to the consumer in a particular format, quality, and price and the ways in which their actions impact on the nature of competition and the distribution of profits at each stage of the production and distribution process. The value chain literature identifies two typical governance forms - given the unpredictability of demand for radios, this strategy proved impractical. Meanwhile radio's fragmented industrial structure prevented control via GM's system of franchise contracts subject to termination without notice, as dealers could turn to other brands.
Manufacturers responded to the high uncertainty of demand for new models and strong demand seasonality by using labour-intensive production systems, which were flexible with regard to the scale of production, but did not offer substantial scale economies.
Meanwhile economies of scope were obviated by many components being externally sourced from specialist firms.
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Co-ordinating distribution
Major radio manufacturers typically organized distribution via independent wholesalers, who were given exclusive territories and in turn served independent dealers.
However, through co-operative and co-ordinated advertising; dealer educational activities;
and a variety of other assistance with marketing and credit provision, manufacturers sought to develop strong relationships with retailers. In return, dealers were expected to follow their marketing policy and prioritise their brand over the others they stocked for activities such as door-to-door canvassing, window displays, or customer recommendation. This addressed a classic problem regarding distribution via independent dealers -if the dealer bore all the costs of their own promotional activities they would engage in less promotion expenditure than the manufacturer (who shared in the benefits) found optimal.
xxvii David Sarnoff of RCA devoted considerable time during 1922 and 1923 to telling jobbers and retailers in the electrical goods and musical instrument trades how radio was to be marketed -addressing their conventions or writing in their journals. His proposed distribution model proved remarkably prescient, foreshadowing most major developments during the 1920s. Sarnoff emphasised that the enthusiast home-constructor era was temporary and that radio would soon be sold as an entertainment durable and a piece of furniture: 'a device which has a very important bearing on our home life, for its sphere is one of culture, education and entertainment… somewhat of the characteristics of the phonograph and other musical instruments… not a mere electrical utility…' To achieve this, retailers should provide:
an attractive store to fit in harmoniously with the accustomed methods of selling musical instruments… the adoption of intensive selling practices, such as special demonstrations, demonstrations in the home, a reasonable amount of local advertising, and inauguration of all those special methods, which have been found valuable in other business in carrying on intensive selling campaigns.
xxviii Sarnoff urged dealers to make their stores attractive to women (whom, he said, accounted for 80 per cent of phonograph sales) and employ staff who could sell on the basis of appearance, simplicity of operation, and value for money. This might involve window displays showing the radio taking pride of place in the living room; separate salesmen to deal with radio hams and mainstream customers; and crews of 'outside' salesmen, who would arrange home trials through door-to-door canvassing, to break down sales resistance and inertia (including fears that radios would be too complicated to operate). xxix He also emphasised the need for time payment schemes to increase affordability.
xxx By the mid-1920s retailers were beginning to note this transition towards a new type of customer and, as Sarnoff had predicted, the need for retail practices that met (increasingly) her needs. Dealers characterised women as being more demanding customers than menexpecting a radio set to be reliable, easy to operate, and attractive in appearance. They were also said to purchase only after undertaking comparison shopping; 'for a woman largely sells the merchandise she buys to herself'. 
The radio dealer
In 1926, when the launch of NBC inaugurated national network broadcasting, an estimated 31,000 radio retailers and 1,000 wholesalers sold the output of some 2,000 manufacturers to a national radio audience of around 20,000,000, owning 5,000,000 Business risks were further accentuated by credit sales. Radios were relatively expensive household durables in the 1920s. As Table 2 shows, the average 1924 unit price of a home radio was around $67.00, plus the cost of four or five tubes (sold separately, at around three dollars each), batteries, and other accessories. with an immediate advance of 90 per cent of the un-matured face value of their paper, less a discount charge. The remaining 10 per cent was then deducted from the final payment on the contract. Under this scheme the only cost to the dealer was the service charge, which could be passed on to the purchaser by adding 0.5 per cent per month to the cash price. lxvii Unlike in autos, where dealers claimed to be coerced into using finance companies tied to manufacturers, even facilities promoted by the set-makers typically involved independent finance companies. lxviii This reflected the weaker market power of individual manufacturers in radio and the impracticality of dealers holding large inventories, given highly unpredictable obsolescence. However, the absence of manufacturer-tied credit removed a potential source of cyclical demand stabilisation. One justification for tied finance in autos was that it would be maintained during hard times, when independent finance companies might tighten provision. lxix Indeed, during the depression the availability of radio commercial time-payment paper tapered off, becoming practically non-existent by 1932 according to Radio Retailing. Dealers were thus forced to finance credit directly, which gave bettercapitalised firms a competitive edge. It was not until the mid-1930s that finance companies again began to show interest in this sector. lxx
Taking radio to the prospect's home
Canvassing was already a proven sales method for phonographs and was quickly adopted by the radio trade. lxxi By the mid-1920s it had become common for dealers to engage in door-to-door selling, typically offering to set up a radio in the home and leave it for several days on trial. This was a relatively novel innovation, though it had been employed by Eureka
Vacuum Cleaner Co. from 1912 and was widely used by refrigerator manufacturers during the 1920s. lxxii Home demonstrations had a number of important attractions for radioallaying fears that operation might prove too complex, or that reception would be too weak, and introducing the family to broadcast entertainment over several days. lxxiii Buyers often perceived home demonstrations as a good way of testing a set's performance, though from the dealer's perspective it was seen primarily, 'as a lever to accelerate the normal process of the realization of the need… -to stimulate desire.' lxxiv It also avoided price comparison with cheaper models, boosting the sale of large console sets.
[Figure 1 near here]
A 1925 Radio Merchandising survey found that 38 per cent of radio dealers in the USA and Canada used door-to-door canvassing. lxxv J.J. Moore, the Radio Dept. manager of New Orleans department store Maison Blanche, stated in 1925 that the most important factor in radio sales was home demonstration, followed by price and service. lxxvi In 1929 Radio
Retailing estimated that most radio dealers employed at least two outside salesmen full-time, with more recruited for special campaigns. Paying a straight commission of 15 per cent or less (with salesmen covering their own expenses) was considered most satisfactory. The sample was said to be well balanced geographically and to cover all types of outlet dealing in radio. lxxxix The survey year, 1928, was described as the most profitable to date, with average net profits having increased by 3.3 per cent of sales compared to their previous (1926) survey. Yet, the survey was surprisingly pessimistic, noting that rising net margins were driven by higher gross margins (boosted by lower stock obsolescence during a year of vigorous demand), while costs had actually increased between the two surveys, by 0.8 per cent of net sales. The report singled out rising selling costs as the chief problem. These had risen from 9.4 to 12.0 per cent of net sales, while publicity expenses had actually fallen, from 5.1 to 3.3 per cent (partly owing to rising manufacturers' co-operative advertising). Rising selling costs were, in turn, attributed to increased door-to-door canvassing.
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The survey included information on net retail sales; costs of merchandise sold; gross profits (sales minus cost of merchandise sold); and expenses -divided into occupancy, selling, publicity, administration, servicing, and other costs.
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To test whether radio manufacturers pushed their retailers into unattractively high levels of selling expenditure (from the retailer's perspective), we compare the relative impact of publicity and selling expense on retailers' gross and net profits. Our results, for a cross-section of 100 retailers, are shown in Table 3 . xcii The estimates are derived using Generalised Least Squares and are transformed in log-form to enable the coefficients to be interpreted as marginal effects. Given a view among some dealers that door-to-door sales reduced the need for a well-located store,
we also include occupancy expenses as a control variable in both estimations.
The table shows that the return on gross profit for selling expenditure was about 40
per cent higher than that for publicity spend. Conversely, the return on net profit (after deducting expenses) on publicity expenditure was more than two and half times as high as that for selling -assuming that the coefficient of selling, which is insignificantly different from zero, is consistently estimated. In both cases the results are well determined, being significant at the 1% level. Occupancy expenditure similarly shows a markedly greater return on net profits than that for selling expense, despite having a lower return on gross profits.
xciii
The analysis thus indicates that direct selling was particularly successful in boosting gross profits, thus benefiting the manufacturer and wholesaler, but offered lower returns than advertising or better retail premises, once the retailer's costs are deducted.
[Insert Table 3 here]
However, while door to door selling may not have advantaged the retailer -compared to a situation where all local dealers abstained from canvassing -it does appear to have acted as a significant barrier to entry. Canvassing was a specialist activity, with significant minimum costs for dedicated staff and vehicles, which were most efficiently employed in teams operating on a full-time (though perhaps temporary) basis. By reducing the pool of customers who purchased radios via conventional shopping, direct sales thus restricted the potential customer base for vendors not prepared to take on these costs. Moreover, authorised dealers for major radio brands had a competitive advantage in canvassing, as heavy manufacturer advertising boosted brand recognition and was often coordinated with dealers' direct sales campaigns -increasing the likelihood that the salesman would receive a positive reception. Thus, by deterring market entry, canvassing may have been of greater benefit to the specialist radio retailer than was evident from its contribution to net margin.
The depression, the 'midget', and the transformation of radio value chains
The depression and its aftermath witnessed a dramatic decline for the specialist radio A new compact radio format, known popularly and in the trade as the 'Midget', first appeared in California in 1929 and -as is often the case for new products that challenge incumbent formats -was initially produced by small start-ups that took advantage of the availability of cheap, externally-sourced, components. xcv Midget sets were essentially "market breakthroughs" -providing substantially higher customer value (for a segment of the market) using the industry's established core technology, rather than "radical innovations"
based on a substantially different technology. xcvi The first midgets were stripped-down versions of standard radios, in smaller cabinets. Miniaturised components were only introduced from 1932, by Emerson, though these were functionally identical to conventional parts (in contrast to later episodes of miniaturisation, such as the transistor, or microchip).
During the 1920s large manufacturers had generally avoided price competition, relying on strong brands, based on quality, innovation, and promotion. The midget's appeal was based on price, while performance initially did not meet accepted industry standards.
However, as radio now provided all-day entertainment, with an increasing element of afternoon soap operas, sports, and other 'talk' content, purity of sound reproduction was becoming less important, especially for supplementary sets. Over the 1930s midgets experienced dramatic improvements in quality -challenging conventional radios for a progressively larger segment of the market.
These developments have strong parallels with the mobile phone industry, where economic recession at the beginning of this century depressed sales and triggered a shift in demand to low-price handsets. Marketing strategy thus shifted from quality and branding to aggressive pricing of entry-level phones, a sub-market where firms outside the established industry proved more successful than the market leaders. xcvii Those firms that became market leaders in small radios had been active in the industry prior to 1929, but not as major receiver manufacturers. Crucially, they typically had established distribution systems. For example, Philco (which tied for receiver market leadership, by volume, with RCA by the end of the 1930s) was a long-established electrical goods producer, which had become a market leader in radio battery eliminators, but only entered receiver production in 1928 (capitalising on its formidable distribution network). Similarly Emerson, which became the largest specialist producer of small radios, had been selling radios since 1924, but as a dealer in surplus equipment rather than a manufacturer. Meanwhile the radio market was experiencing a general trend towards lower unit prices, as shown in Table 2 .
Midget radios undermined the quality-branding competitive advantages of the industry's established leaders. Of the four leading set makers in 1929, three -Atwater Kent, Grigsby-Grunow, and Crosley -proved unable to weather this storm. civ Only RCA remained as a major player in radio manufacture, though this was largely due to its strengths in patents, components production and, increasingly, broadcasting. Moreover, its market position had been strongest in the highest price classes of sets and it successfully held its lead in these segments during the 1930s.
As a 1930 article noted, the midget appeared to have answered the radio retailer's dream, 'no deliveries, no financing, no collection grief, no service. "Just one long, sweet process of fittin' em with tubes and passin' em over the counter to eager buyers."' cv Yet by reducing the need for home demonstration, delivery and servicing; credit; and showrooms worthy of a prestige piece of furniture; the midget eroded the key differentiating advantages of the specialist dealer. Moreover, as models had shelf lives of several years, rather than the annual model changes characteristic of conventional radios, the specialist retailer's skills of managing rapidly depreciating inventory commanded less of a premium. By removing the need for the most troublesome aspects of the dealer's activities, the midget had opened up radio to the general retailer, who sold on price and did not require close co-operation with the manufacturer.
Thus it was the weakness, rather than strength, of manufacturers' control over dealers, that undermined their long-term survival. Established manufacturers proved powerless to block midget radios, in contrast to British set-makers, who supressed the format throughout the 1930s (via a black-list of non-conforming retailers -which was perfectly legal in the absence of any effective British anti-trust legislation). cvi In a depression market, specialist
dealers had embraced what they believed to be a novelty and loss-leader, apparently unaware of the fundamental threat it posed to their business model.
Conclusion
Like the refrigerator and washing machine, the radio of the early 1920s was an expensive mechanical novelty, requiring intensive advertising, considerable after-sales service, and costly door-to-door canvassing. By the late 1930s all three of these products had been largely transformed into 'staple' merchandise, increasingly marketed using standard retail channels and methods. However, while refrigerators and washing machines experienced this transition as an evolutionary process, with new innovations tending to reinforce the first mover advantages of the leading firms and their established distribution networks, in radio it was marked by major disruptions to established industry structures and distribution channels. and attitudes to multinational enterprises. 
